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RENEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILITY 
AFTER APARTHEID: 
LISTENING TO PERPETRATOR TESTIMONY 
MARK SANDERS* 
 On July 14, 1997, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission met for a 
public hearing in Cape Town, South Africa.1  The Commission allowed 
five former African National Congress cadres to question Captain Jeffrey 
Benzien regarding his application for amnesty for acts of killing and 
torture.  Since the 1980s Captain Benzien had been a member of the Cape 
Town Security Police and was notorious for his methods of torture.  His 
questioners—Tony Yengeni, Ashley Forbes, Gary Kruser, Peter Jacobs, 
and Bongani Jonas—had been tortured by him while in police custody.  
Now they were demanding that Captain Benzien describe, even enact 
before the Commission, the techniques he applied during interrogation.  
South Africa and the world watched as Jeffrey Benzien simulated the “wet 
bag” torture method, where a water-soaked bag is placed over the head of 
the victim to induce suffocation. 
Like a handful of other occasions at which victims faced perpetrators,2 
the hearing instantly became a Truth Commission touchstone.  As in the 
                                                                 
 *  Assistant Professor, Department of English and American Literature, Brandeis 
University; Ph.D., 1998, M.A., 1992, Columbia University; B.A. (Hons.), 1990, University 
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 1. See Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Amnesty Hearing, July 14, 1997 
(interview of Jeffrey Benzien), available athttp://www.doj.gov.za/trc/amntrans/ 
ct3/benzien.htm [hereinafter Benzien Hearing].  The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
was established at the end of 1995 to uncover and record gross human rights violations of 
the apartheid era in South Africa.  See Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/index.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2002).  Its mandate included 
restoring the civil and human dignity of victims by allowing them to testify to violations 
done to them, and recommending measures of reparation.  The Commission was also 
empowered to grant amnesty from criminal and civil prosecution to perpetrators in return 
for full disclosure of violations committed by them, provided the acts in question were 
connected to, and commensurate with, a political goal. 
 2. The Saint James Church and Heidelberg Tavern attackers and the killers of Amy 
Biehl are other examples.  See generally Truth & Reconcilation Comm’n, Amnesty Hearing 
Transcripts 1997, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/ 
amntrans/am1997.htm. 
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other instances, the quasi-juridical — or from another point of view, 
“legalistic” — conventions governing the hearings were violated.3  
However, in the Benzien case, the commentators were more specific about 
the nature and significance of the transgression.  At last the roles were 
reversed and “the torturer . . . was confronted by the tortured.”4 
Other observers regard the events that unfolded at Benzien’s hearing in a 
less favorable light.  For instance, Antjie Krog, who covered the Truth 
Commission’s hearings for South African Broadcasting Corporation radio, 
wrote the following about the proceedings: 
Initially the body language of the tortured was clear: “No one else 
counts, not the Amnesty Committee, not the lawyers, not the audience—
what counts today is you and me.  And we sit opposite each other, just 
like ten years ago.  Except that I am not at your mercy—you are at mine.  
And I will ask you the questions that have haunted me ever since. “  But 
it isn’t that easy.5 
The voice of Tony Yengeni, a member of Parliament, “has become 
known for its tone of confidence—sometimes tinged with arrogance,” but 
now “sounds strangely different—his voice somehow choked.”6  Then 
there are the questions that Captain Benzien asks, which have the effect of 
turning the tables again and putting the victims at the perpetrator’s mercy.  
Having made Benzien demonstrate the “wet bag,” Krog observes, 
“Yengeni has to pay dearly.  Back at the table, Benzien quietly turns on 
him and with one accurate blow, shatters Yengeni’s political profile right 
across the country.  ‘Do you remember, Mr. Yengeni, that within thirty 
minutes you betrayed Jennifer Schreiner?  Do you remember pointing out 
Bongani Jonas to us on the highway?’”7 
Benzien then proceeded to testify about the “special relationship” he 
                                                                 
 3. In a compilation of SABC radio coverage of the Commission released in 2000, the 
Benzien hearing is presented as follows: 
Surviving victims of gross human rights abuses continued to steer the Truth 
Commission’s Amnesty Committee into uncharted territory in mid-July 1997.  
Until then, the amnesty script was predominantly couched in legalities, with only 
judges and lawyers jogging the memories of both perpetrator and victim.  But all 
this changed during the amnesty hearing of former Western Cape security 
policeman Captain Jeff Benzien. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S HUMAN SPIRIT vol. 3, disc 1, track 8 (South African Broadcasting Corp. 
2000), available at http://www.sabctruth.co.za/worlds.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2001); see 
also ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 252-53 (2000) (noting that, among the 
Commissioners, there was sometimes a discomfort with departures from “judicial” 
procedure). 
 4. See Truth Commission Special Report (SABC television broadcast, July 20, 1997) 
(quoting Max du Preez’s summation in his weekly television wrap-up). 
 5. ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF M Y SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS OF 
FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA  93 (2nd ed. 1999). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 93-94. 
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claimed he shared with Ashley Forbes: “You, I can remember especially 
because I think that the two of us . . . really became quite close . . . I may 
be mistaken, but I would say relatively good friends in a way . . . . Do you 
remember the time when you saw snow for the first time?”8  As Krog 
observes, “[a] torturer’s success depends on his intimate knowledge of the 
human psyche.  Benzien is a connoisseur.  Within the first few minutes, he 
manages to manipulate most of his victims back into the roles of their 
previous relationship—where he has the power and they the fragility.”9 
Yazir Henry, another Western Cape cadre tortured by the Security 
Police, echoes Krog’s observations.  Henry writes that the decision to grant 
Jeffrey Benzien amnesty “will remain unpopular and continue to be 
contested and widely regarded as illegitimate.”10  Henry states further that 
not only does “the community” perceive that “[Benzien] did not make full 
disclosure and [that] his actions were disproportionate to his political 
motivation,” thus disqualifying him from amnesty under the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act,11 but that: 
He also showed very little remorse and in some ways, because of his 
attitude, continued to torture Yengeni and Forbes in his appearance 
before the Commission.  He asked Yengeni to remember how he gave up 
not only his arms but also his comrade Bongani Jonas without the 
security police having to lay a finger on him.  He asked Forbes to tell the 
audience that he (Benzien) had not only brought him ice cream and 
books but also broke bread with him and played with him in the snow 
during his detention. 
I remember asking myself how a process that was supposed to be 
holding him accountable for his brutal and systematic torture of people 
could go so horribly wrong.  I struggled with my anger and resolved not 
to participate in any further amnesty proceedings—even though I knew 
that the people responsible for torturing and nearly killing me would 
apply for amnesty.  I realised that the amnesty process was hampering 
my own efforts to deal with the trauma of capture, detention and the 
obligation to watch a comrade and friend die in front of me as a result of 
the police opening fire with guns and hand grenades.12 
Common to Antjie Krog’s and Yazir Henry’s accounts of what happened 
at the Benzien hearing is the perception that the “process . . . [went] 
                                                                 
 8. Benzien Hearing, supra note 1, at 51/184 (No page numbers were found in the text 
of the hearing, therefore, for citation of the transcript, the author has relied on the pagination 
generated by his web-browser and printer software, which paginates the document 1-184). 
 9. KROG, supra note 5, at 95. 
 10. YAZIR HENRY , Where Healing Begins, in  LOOKING BACK , REACHING FORWARD : 
REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 171 
(Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000). 
 11. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995. 
 12. HENRY , supra note 10, at 171. 
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horribly wrong.”13  The intuition guiding each of their versions is that the 
way in which the proceedings unfolded returned Yengeni, Forbes and the 
others to the time of the offense for which Benzien was applying for 
amnesty.  Krog notes, “[w]ithin the first few minutes he manages to 
manipulate most of his victims back into the roles of their previous 
relationship — where he has the power and they the fragility.”14  As Henry 
reported, “[h]e . . . in some ways . . . continued to torture Yengeni and 
Forbes and others in his appearance before the Commission.”15  For Henry, 
the exchange with Benzien is not limited to the re-injury of those directly 
involved.  The exchange with Benzien takes him, as a member of the 
audience, back to when he was detained and tortured, and the complicated 
events that ensued.  There is a sense to be gained from both Krog and 
Henry, that for the good of the victim, a return to, or a continuation of, the 
offense ought not to take place.  Or, at the very least, not with the 
perpetrator. 
But is such a return not what Max du Preez celebrates in Truth 
Commission Special Report?16  Is it not what Du Preez, and Krog, although 
Krog does not celebrate it, sense that Yengeni and the others seek from 
Benzien?  By reversing roles and asking Benzien questions, are they, in 
effect, not continuing the contest begun ten years before, so that they can 
wrest control of the situation from Benzien, and retrospectively gain the 
upper hand?  If this is their game, it is a hazardous one.  Du Preez declares 
the questioners the winners, but Krog and Henry dissent.  The five 
confronting Benzien are like assault victims of a professional boxer 
entering the ring one by one to get their own back.  Common sense tells us 
that a subpoena will deprive the boxer of none of his advantage over his 
victims.  To the extent that one can even speak of victory going to either 
party, if Benzien, the practiced torturer has won the first bout, what reason 
do we have to think that he should lose the rematch? 
Such considerations lie behind the regular conduct of the Truth 
Commission’s public proceedings, which include a separation of the 
victim’s human rights violation hearing from the perpetrator’s amnesty 
hearing.  Additionally, cross-examination at amnesty hearings is typically 
restricted to victims’ lawyers.17  As a quasi-juridical body linking forensic 
                                                                 
 13. Id. 
 14. KROG, supra note 5, at 95. 
 15. HENRY , supra note 10, at 171. 
 16. See Truth Commission Special Report, supra note 4. 
 17. See DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 176-78 (1999) 
(explaining that the Commission’s precautions against victims having to confront 
perpetrators at hearings were balanced by its preparedness to arrange voluntary meetings 
between victims and perpetrators at other venues). 
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truth-seeking and rehabilitative telling,18 the Truth Commission reveals the 
extent to which such provisions for mediation and the problems of 
responsibility they seek to address are a shared concern of law and 
psychoanalysis. 
The hearing displays, in psychoanalytic terms, the phenomenon of 
“transference.”  Transference is a way of staging in the present a past set of 
experiences, and is an alternative to direct confrontation with figures who 
are linked to traumatic events.19  Sigmund Freud describes transferences in 
the following manner: 
Transferences are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and 
phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of 
the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for 
their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the 
physician.  To put it another way: a whole series of psychological 
experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to 
the person of the physician at the present moment.20 
Two aspects of Freud’s account are relevant here: the transposition of 
figures and the assimilation of temporalities.21  The process of repetition, 
acting out, and working through, the components of the therapeutic cure, 
depends upon this nexus.  In a similar way, the Truth Commission makes 
use of this process, or a part of it, through human rights violation hearings, 
which are designed to fulfill a mandate of “restor[ing] the human and civil 
dignity of the victims.”22  In the absence of perpetrators willing to come 
forward, the Commission assumes responsibility23 for the violation(s) of 
the perpetrator. 
The perpetrator does not testify at the human rights violation hearing.  
Further, amnesty-seekers are typically cross-examined not by the victims 
themselves but by their legal representatives, and then usually only in cases 
where the victims are withholding their support for the amnesty 
application.  The process is mediated, as in the therapeutic situation, and 
the return to the time of the offense is managed by proxy.  This is how the 
                                                                 
 18. See generally  Mark Sanders, Truth, Telling, Questioning: The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull, and Literature after 
Apartheid, 46.1 M ODERN FICTION STUDIES 13-41 (Spring 2000), available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_fiction_studies/v046/46.1sanders.html. 
 19. See J. LAPLANCHE & J.B. PONTALIS, THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 455-64 
(1973). 
 20. Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (“Dora”), in CASE 
HISTORIES I 157-58 (Pelican Freud Library ed., 1977) (1905). 
 21. See id. 
 22. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 112 n.6 (1998). 
 23. See id. at vol. 5, 170-71 (explaining that this method of assuming responsibility is 
essential to counterbalance amnesty). 
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law endeavors to contain and limit the inevitable repetition of the offense. 
To a certain extent, we, as interdisciplinary scholars of law, want things 
to go awry, to “go wrong.”  When operating boundaries are transgressed 
and quasi-juridical conventions are renegotiated, other dimensions of 
responsibility may be broached.  Once that takes place, however, one 
cannot anticipate what will unfold.  One would not want to say 
categorically that a confrontation between the parties themselves is 
detrimental to the victim or, indeed, to the perpetrator, but the attendant 
risks are unavoidable.  It seems clear that, in the case of Benzien’s amnesty 
hearing, if we accept Yazir Henry’s account, the process does “go horribly 
wrong” because there takes place a direct confrontation. 24  Returning both 
parties to the time of the offense renders the victim vulnerable again.  This 
is what Yazir Henry senses, although I would not agree that the process 
“goes horribly wrong” simply “because of [Benzien’s] attitude.”25  The 
attitude of his questioners also takes a hand.  More is required to manage 
the situation, so that the trauma is not simply repeated, but is also worked 
through.  Ashley Forbes’s comment, in the same installment of Truth 
Commission Special Report, that he did not seek counseling is perhaps a 
revealing one.  Forbes, along with Yengeni and the others, not only 
eschews the Commission’s safeguards but rejects another available 
mechanism for reparative telling and listening.  The tortured refuse the 
paths of mediation offered by both psychoanalysis (albeit in the weak sense 
represented by psychological counseling), and the law.  This is what is at 
stake when we ask whether the “legalities” of the process ought to be 
abandoned, or, admit improvised modifications such as Yengeni and the 
others set in motion, and which some have uncritically celebrated—while 
Yazir Henry walks away from a hearing which is no longer an amnesty 
hearing but a human rights violation hearing, except that it is not just tales 
of the past being told, but new violations that are being committed. 
Could the critical picture I am presenting be motivated by an 
unacknowledged impulse to lay down the law in order to disavow an 
unavoidable risk?  Or, worse still, by a compulsion to keep the victim in the 
position of victim (one famously analyzed by Freud in “‘A Child is Being 
Beaten’”)?26  How else, though, might one frame an analysis of the Benzien 
hearing?  As interdisciplinary minds attuned and sympathetic to a crossing 
of boundaries and a transgression of rules, we have, nevertheless, to ask, 
once quasi-juridical mediation has been given up, whether any other 
                                                                 
 24. See HENRY , supra note 10, at 171. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See 17 SIGMUND FREUD, ‘A Child is Being Beaten’ — A Contribution to the Study of 
the Origin of Sexual Perversions, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 175-204 (James Strachey & Anna Freud trans. 
& eds., 1974). 
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dimension of responsibility has in fact been broached.  That remains the 
criterion.  Such an event cannot be anticipated, but may perhaps be isolated 
and analyzed after all is said and done. 
Rather than arriving at definite conclusions, I propose that if one combs 
the transcript of the hearing, it may be possible to find beyond a simple 
repetition and reversal of roles, an amendment of conduct.  The focus of 
critical commentary has been on the struggle between Benzien and his 
victims (and whether victory goes to either side), Benzien’s attitude, or 
whether such a contest ought, for the welfare of those involved, to have 
been staged in the first place.  There are elements in Benzien’s testimony, 
however, which not only augment our understanding of the relationship 
between torturer and tortured and its durability (which I read Krog to have 
in mind when she writes that “it isn’t that easy”), but also suggest 
something else.  Clearly, Yengeni and the others conduct themselves as if 
they want something from Benzien besides his amnesty application; if not 
revenge exactly, at least a further set of admissions.  Beyond that, they 
want him to submit to them and their interrogation.  If this is so, Benzien 
responds, as Krog observes, by getting back at Yengeni and the others.  
Once the game is on, generally speaking he will not allow them to get the 
upper hand.27 
But, there are moments of a different quality.  There are, first of all, 
occasions when Benzien apologizes (Ek vra om verskoning), or asks for 
forgiveness for what he did. 28  Another set of remarks relate directly to the 
repetition going on at the hearing.  Although Benzien frequently responds 
to his questioners with questions and statements that render them 
vulnerable,29 he also, on at least two occasions reflected by the transcript, 
desists from this pattern, reining himself in when he is about to launch into 
an interrogation: “As a matter of interest, I think I should stop here, and 
just answer his [Jonas’s] question . . . . Mr. Jacobs, I don’t know what 
position you hold in the Security Branch now, but do you—okay you are 
asking me the questions.”30  Benzien’s restraint may simply be out of 
respect for, or deference to, the authority of the court of law.  As a police 
veteran, he has testified many times, and as the Commission observes, 
much leeway is being granted to the others who must be guided in their 
                                                                 
 27. There is also the question of the procedures for the amnesty hearing and their basis: 
if amnesty is a conditional “forgetting,” is it just that the perpetrator has to “return” to or 
“re-enact” a past situation, in which, as Benzien does, he/she might find him/herself 
committing further violations? 
 28. See Benzien Hearing, supra note 1, at 2, 116/184. 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 24, 25, 36ff, 39f, 43, 50, 53f, 56, 63, 66, 67, 85, 88, 109, 119 & 
140/184. 
 30. Id. at 121, 139/184. 
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cross-examination.31  These moments may, however, ultimately elude the 
framework of the law. 
When we ask whether there will have been responsibility, we look for a 
reinvention rather than a mechanical application of rules.32  If the first thing 
we notice about Benzien’s hearing is the unanticipated interrogation of 
Benzien by his victims, perhaps we can, once new rules governing the time 
of the offense as it is reenacted have been put in place, in turn observe a 
reinvention on the part of Benzien.  Given that what we are witnessing is 
indeed, as Krog and Henry suspect, a repetition or continuation of the old 
situation, for Benzien to have responded by becoming the interrogator all 
over again may have been the least unexpected outcome.  Benzien himself 
keeps saying, with reference to his shooting of cadre Ashley Kriel, that “the 
tables could have been turned.”33  To have responded in any other way 
would have been exceptional.  Yet there are times where he appears to act 
otherwise, and the pattern of compulsive or compelled behavior is, if not 
broken, significantly interrupted. 
Let us assume that Benzien is not simply upholding the rules of conduct 
governing amnesty hearings, which are progressively relaxed when he is 
cross-examined.  It may then be that in those places where he desists from 
questioning, Benzien is, as much as his questioners, attempting to work 
things out with the others without the aid of the Commission as mediator.  
As observed, once Yengeni and the others take it upon themselves to 
question Benzien, they abdicate the Commission’s mediation and its 
preparedness to appear as their proxy.  Benzien’s response is, in general, to 
turn the tables on them and to become their interrogator once more.  When 
he appeals to the Commission’s rules in order not to question his 
questioners, he is, I propose, no longer simply availing himself of the 
“transference” offered by the Commission, but may instead be acting as his 
own proxy for the old Jeffrey Benzien.  It is hardly surprising that these 
fleeting moments elude the memory of the hearing of the ones questioning.  
Like Ashley Forbes’s excursion to the snows of the hinterland, these 
moments do not detract from the overall experience of past and renewed 
violation.  It remains, nevertheless, to weigh them, if not for what they are, 
then for what they could have been.  If one thing they might indicate is a 
mending of ways commonly thought to be a condition of forgiveness, and 
thus a practical asking by Benzien of forgiveness, in this case, I do not 
                                                                 
 31. See id. at 127/184. 
 32. See generally Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of 
Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 967 (1990) (stating that responsibility involves more 
than simply invoking a rule, and that responsible decision, strictly speaking, entails acting in 
the absence of any known rule). 
 33. Benzien Hearing, supra note 1, at 8/184 (reporting that Benzien testified regarding 
the shooting of Kriel before being questioned by the five victims). 
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know, and perhaps cannot ultimately know, what they are, even as I sense 
that they, like the questions posed by his victims, are something other, 
something more, than a “legalistic” ploy or gesture. 
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